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Youth as Victims and Offenders in the
Criminal Justice System: A Charter
Analysis — Recognizing Vulnerability
Nicholas Bala

I. INTRODUCTION: RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL NATURE OF YOUTH
Although it is not always well articulated by judges, the Canadian
courts have recognized that youth1 have a special status in the criminal
justice system, one that is reflected in legislation and international law
and that should also be reflected in the interpretation of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 Youth have limited capacities and
greater vulnerability than adults, and are therefore given a special legal
status. In the context of their relationships with police and in the youth
courts, this has meant that judges have recognized that youth are entitled
to special protections, and hence should be granted enhanced rights
under the Charter compared to adults; the courts have also upheld the
constitutional validity of legislation that affords youth special protections.
In other contexts, however, the courts have held that the special
vulnerability of youth means that adult caregivers, such as parents and
school officials, have special powers in regard to them; accordingly, the
Charter has also been interpreted in a way that has limited the rights of
youth, in the belief that this is necessary to protect their interests.
This paper reviews some of the leading Charter decisions about youth
in the criminal justice system, first examining cases in which youth are
charged with offences, and then considering cases that deal with them as
victims and witnesses. The focus will be on Charter jurisprudence, though


Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University.
A note on terminology: in this paper, the term “child” will generally be used to refer to
persons under the age of 12, and “youth” to refer to those 12 to 17 years inclusive. This is the way
that the terms are generally used in Canada’s criminal justice laws, most notably the Youth Criminal
Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1. In some contexts, however, the terms “youth” and “child” are used
synonymously to refer to persons under the age of 18.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 (hereinafter “the Charter”).
1
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there will be references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child,3 an international treaty that the Canadian courts have
considered in interpreting the Charter and Canadian legislation.4
A number of significant constitutional decisions have recognized the
vulnerability and special nature of youth, but the most important decision
will only be rendered by the Supreme Court after this paper has been
sent to the publisher, in a case dealing with the constitutional validity of
provisions that create a presumption of adult sentencing for youth found
guilty of certain very serious offences. Though there are intellectual risks
in predicting how the Court will deal with issues, in this paper I argue
that its prior decisions suggest that the Court will continue to recognize
that youth is a distinct phase of life that is entitled to special recognition
under the Charter by always placing an onus on the state to establish
why a young offender should be treated as an adult.

II. YOUTH AS OFFENDERS
It is interesting to observe that the 1984 repeal of the Juvenile
Delinquents Act,5 originally enacted in 1908 to deal with youths who
violate the criminal law, was prompted in part by the coming into force
of the Charter. The JDA created a highly discretionary juvenile justice
regime which gave little attention to legal rights of youth. While the
deficencies of the JDA were becoming apparent by the mid-1960s,6 it
was not until 1984 that the Young Offenders Act7 replaced the JDA. Soon
after the Charter came into effect in 1982, parts of the JDA were subject
to successful Charter challenge, and more challenges would have followed
if the JDA had not been repealed.8 A strong impetus for the enactment of
the YOA was the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter in 1982.
3

Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 has also been influential
in the United States, which is not a signatory. The Convention was cited in Roper v. Simmons,
125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005), where the United States Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty
on a person who was under the age of 18 at the time of committing a murder was “cruel and
unusual punishment” and hence a violation of the American Constitution. This important decision
recognized the vulnerability and special status of youth, relying in part on international law.
5
First enacted as S.C. 1908, c. 40; subject to minor amendments over the years, finally as
Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3 [hereinafter “JDA”].
6
See, e.g., Canada, Department of Justice, Report of the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency,
Juvenile Delinquency in Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1965).
7
R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, enacted as S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110 [hereinafter “YOA”].
8
Nicholas Bala, “Constitutional Challenges Mark Demise of Juvenile Delinquents Act”
(1983) 30 C.R. (3d) 245.
4
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The informality and lack of legal rights for youths under the JDA were
inconsistent with the legal protections recognized in the Charter, while
the interprovincial variation allowed by the JDA for such issues as the
commencement of adulthood was contrary to the equal protection of the
law guaranteed by section 15 of the Charter.
The YOA established a uniform national age jurisdiction of 12 through
to the 18th birthday, and provided much greater recognition for the legal
rights of youth, developments consistent with the emphasis in the Charter
on due process of law and equal treatment under the law.9 The YOA and
its successor, the Youth Criminal Justice Act,10 which came into force
in 2003, afford youth significant statutory protections, for example, in
granting rights to youth during police questioning and for access to
appointed counsel. These statutory rights reflect legislative recognition
of the vulnerability of youth and of the need to treat their vulnerability
in a fashion that promotes their rehabilitation. In a practical sense, in
many situations involving youth, counsel and the courts do not have to
explicitly consider the Charter, as Parliament has afforded youth substantial
statutory protections beyond those guaranteed under the Charter.
1. A Constitutional Right for Youth Not to Be Treated as Adults?
In 2003, the Quebec Court of Appeal in Québec (Ministre de la Justice)
c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice),11 held that section 72(2) of the YCJA,12
which places an “onus” on a youth found guilty of a “presumptive offence”
to satisfy the court as to why an adult sentence should not be imposed,
is unconstitutional, as it violates section 7 of the Charter. Two 2006
appellate judgments, R. v. B. (D.)13 of the Ontario Court of Appeal and
9
R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1. Some critics have decried the increased emphasis on due process
and legal rights. See, for example, J. Hackler, “An Impressionistic View of Canadian Juvenile Justice:
1965 to 1999” (2001) 20 Can. J. Comm. Mental Health 17, at 17-21, who writes that the enactment
of the YOA represented:
a basic change . . . a transfer of influence from social workers to lawyers. Juveniles got certain
legal protections, but we did not foresee that the juveniles and their families would become
victims of the legal process. . . . The vast increase in the number of judges, prosecutors,
defence lawyers and closed-custody institutions is the result of one profession, law, expanding
into an area previously dominated by another, social work . . . but it is too late to go back.
Lawyers have replaced social workers as the main players in juvenile justice.
10
S.C. 2002, c. 1, Royal Assent February 19, 2002, in force April 1, 2003 [hereinafter “YCJA”].
11
[2003] J.Q. no 2850, 10 C.R. (6th) 281 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Québec c. Canada”].
12
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
13
[2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2006]
S.C.C.A. No. 195 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. T. (K.D.)14 of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, came to opposite
conclusions about the constitutionality of section 72(2). The question of
the constitutional validity of this provision will be resolved by the
Supreme Court of Canada when it renders its judgment on the Crown’s
appeal from the Ontario decision some time in 2008.15 That judgment is
likely to be one of the most significant decisions related to youth in
Canadian history, as the question of whether the Charter requires that
youthful offenders are to be treated in a way that takes greater account
of their needs than adult offenders is related to the fundamental question
of whether the Charter requires distinctive treatment of youth.
Central to the arguments about the unconstitutionality of section
72(2) of the YCJA16 is the interpretative significance of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child17 for section 7 of the Charter. Article 37 of the
Convention deals with confinement of youth, emphasizing that custody
is to be a “last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time”,
while Article 40 establishes principles that are to govern responses to
offending by “children” (all those under 18 years of age), placing an
emphasis on rehabilitation. The Convention does not deal explicitly with
the imposition of adult sentences for youth, though Article 37(a)
prohibits capital punishment for those who were juveniles at the time of
commission of an offence, and Article 37(c) specifies that “every child
deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered
in the child’s best interest not to do so.” When Canada ratified the
Convention it filed a reservation to Article 37(c), stipulating that it did
not view itself as bound by this provision; the reservation was filed
because the provisions of Canada’s youth justice laws — both then and
now — do not use a “best interests” test for determining whether a youth
should be placed in custody with adults.18
14

[2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).
[2006] S.C.C.A. 195 (S.C.C.), appeal argued October 10, 2007. For a fuller discussion
of some of the issues in this case, see Nicholas Bala, “Charter Challenges to Presumptive Adult
Sentences for Serious Youth Offenders” (2006) 37 C.R. (6th) 287.
16
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
17
Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
18
Under s. 30(4) of the YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1, a youth may be detained with adults before
adjudication if the youth court considers that this would be “in the best interests of the young
person or in the public interest” (emphasis added). Under s. 76(2) a court may order a youth who is
subject to an adult sentence and under 18 years of age is to be confined with adults, if this is
considered by the court to be in the “best interests” of the youth or necessary for the “safety of
others”. Subsection 76(2) creates a presumption that a young person subject to an adult sentence
will be placed in an adult facility once he or she reaches the age of 18 years.
15
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The Convention on the Rights of the Child19 does not afford individual
Canadian youth any remedies, or create directly enforceable rights.
However, in its 1999 decision in Baker v. Canada,20 the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the Convention should be used to assist in the
interpretation of legislation. Further, as will be discussed below, subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court make clear that the Convention may be
cited to help interpret the Charter, in particular to give meaning to the
“principles of fundamental justice”.
(a) The Quebec Court of Appeal Decision
Prior to the YCJA21 coming into effect, the Attorney General of Quebec
brought a reference case before the Quebec Court of Appeal, arguing
that some provisions of the YCJA, including those governing adult
sentencing and the publication of identifying information about young
offenders, are incompatible with international law and in violation of the
Charter. In March 2003, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal
rendered its decision in Québec c. Canada,22 holding that the “principles
of fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter include the right of
juveniles to treatment separate from adults. The Court based its approach
to section 7 of the Charter both on the long history of special treatment
of juvenile offenders in the Canadian justice system and on international
law, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child.23 The Court
ruled that the “principles of fundamental justice” include recognition that:
(1) The treatment of young offenders in the criminal justice system must
be separate and different from the treatment of adults.
(2) Rehabilitation, not repression and deterrence, must be the basis of
legislative and judicial intervention involving young offenders.
(3) The youth justice system must restrict disclosure of the identity
of minors in order to prevent stigmatization, which could limit
rehabilitation.
19

Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.).
21
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
22
Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850,
10 C.R. (6th) 281 (Que. C.A.).
23
Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850,
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at paras. 3 and 231 (Que. C.A.). Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S.
1992 No. 3.
20
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(4) The youth justice system must consider the best interests of the
child.24
Some of these principles are very broad (and, as discussed below, the
fourth seems inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence),
but the Quebec Court of Appeal limited the effect of these principles by
engaging in an internal balancing exercise within section 7 when applying
them. Consistent with prior Supreme Court of Canada section 7 Charter
jurisprudence,25 the Court of Appeal held that these principles must be
applied so as to strike a “certain balance” between the public’s right to
be protected and the right of young people to be treated differently from
adults and to have rehabilitation as the main focus of decisions that
concern them.26
The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled unconstitutional section 72(2) of
the YCJA,27 which places an onus on youths 14 years of age or older,
and found guilty of a “presumptive offence”, to justify why they should
be sentenced as youths rather than as adults. The Court concluded that
this provision places an “excessive burden [on youth], considering the
vulnerability of the young persons on whom it rests and the purposes” of
the YCJA.28 While the Court accepted that, in some very serious youth
cases, an adult sentence may be appropriate, the Court held that section 7
of the Charter requires that in every case the onus should be on the
Crown to justify the denial of youth status.
In May 2003, in response to the Quebec Court of Appeal judgment,
the then federal Liberal government announced that the decision would
not be appealed, and that the government would “soon” introduce
amendments to the YCJA29 to make the Act consistent with that decision.
The purpose of these amendments would have been to ensure a uniform
24

Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850,
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at paras. 215 and 231 (Que. C.A.).
25
See Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). The
concept of “internal balancing” is distinguished from the “external balancing” that results when s. 1
of the Charter is invoked.
26
Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850,
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at para. 237 (Que. C.A.).
27
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
28
Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] J.Q. no 2850,
10 C.R. (6th) 281, at para. 249 (Que. C.A.). The Court of Appeal also held that s. 110(2)(b) of the
YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1 which allows courts to permit identifying publicity about youths convicted
of presumptive offences but who receive youth sentences rather than adult sentences, violates s. 7
of the Charter.
29
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
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national response, and to resolve procedural issues about how and when
an adult sentence can be imposed. In fact, legislative amendments were
not introduced, and this type of legislative reform will not be considered
until after the Supreme Court deals with this issue.
(b) The British Columbia Court of Appeal: R. v. T. (K.D.)
In its January 2006 decision in R. v. T. (K.D.),30 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal declined to follow the decision of the Quebec Court of
Appeal, and upheld the constitutional validity of section 72(2), placing
an onus on a youth to justify not having an adult sentence in a manslaughter
case. The British Columbia Court held that section 7 of the Charter does
not include as a principle of fundamental justice that young offenders
are presumptively to be treated differently from adults. In the case
before the Court, it reversed the trial judge and concluded that the youth
should receive an adult sentence.
One important reason that the British Columbia Court gave for
rejecting the approach of the Quebec Court 31 was that the fourth
“principle of fundamental justice” which the Quebec Court recognized,
that the youth court system must make decisions that “consider the best
interests of the child”, is inconsistent with the 2004 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth
and the Law v. Canada.32 In that decision, McLachlin C.J.C. wrote for
the majority, upholding the constitutional validity of section 43 of the
Criminal Code,33 which authorizes use of reasonable force for the purpose
of the correction of children. In the course of her judgment, she concluded
that requiring decisions to be made in accordance with the “best interests
of the child” is not a principle of fundamental justice.
While it is true that this fourth principle — the best interests principle
— was rejected by the Supreme Court in Canadian Foundation for
Children,34 the Quebec Court did not even mention this particular principle
in dealing with the Charter challenges to sections 72(2) and 110(2), but
rather focused on the first two of the principles — that youths must be
30

[2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).
R. v. T. (K.D.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243, at para. 29 (B.C.C.A.).
32
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation for
Children”].
33
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
34
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004]
1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
31
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treated separately from adults and in a way that focuses on their
rehabilitation.
Another argument that the British Columbia Court of Appeal
considered significant is that section 72(2) of the YCJA35 does not place
an onerous burden on the convicted youth. The British Columbia Court
quoted from an Ontario trial decision (now overruled in Ontario), R. v.
L. (D.) (No. 2), where Duncan J. wrote:
… the significance of onus in the scheme under consideration can be
over-stated. At the end of the day, the Court will either be satisfied
that an appropriate sentence can be achieved under the youth system
or that it can not — and will decide accordingly.36

In taking this approach to section 72(2), both the British Columbia Court
of Appeal and Duncan J. in R. v. L. (D.) (No. 2)37 placed significant
emphasis on an interpretation given to the transfer provision of the
YOA38 by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 1989 decision in R. v. M.
(S.H.), where McLachlin J. wrote:
I share the view that application of the concepts of burden and onus
to the transfer provisions of the Young Offenders Act may not be helpful.
.....
Nor do I find it helpful to cast the issue in terms of a civil or criminal
standard of proof. Those concepts are typically concerned with establishing
whether something took place. … But it is less helpful to ask oneself
whether a young person should be tried in ordinary court “on a balance
of probabilities”. One is not talking about something which is probable
or improbable when one enters into the exercise of … weighing and
balancing all the relevant considerations, [to decide whether] … the case
should be transferred to ordinary court.39

It is submitted that this passage is not relevant for deciding about the
interpretation or constitutionality of section 72(2) of the YCJA,40 since
the Court in R. v. M. (S.H.) was discussing the 1984 version of the YOA,
which placed no onus on any party at a transfer hearing, but simply
35

S.C. 2002, c. 1.
[2005] O.J. No. 3183, at para. 12 (Ont. C.J.), per Duncan J. Quoted at para. 58 by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. T. (K.D.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).
37
R. v. L. (D.) (No. 2), [2005] O.J. No. 3183 (Ont. C.J.).
38
R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1.
39
[1989] S.C.J. No. 93, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 503, at 546 (S.C.C.), quoted by the Court of
Appeal in R. v. T. (K.D.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243, at para. 59 (B.C.C.A.).
40
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
36

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) YOUTH AS VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS

603

stated that the youth court was to be “satisfied” that transfer should occur.
It was only in 1995 that the YOA was amended to introduce the concept
of “onus”,41 and, in regard to the most serious presumptive offences, to
place an onus on youth to satisfy the court why a youth should not be
tried as an adult. It is that onus provision, continued in the YCJA section
72(2), which is the subject of controversy.
It is true that in practice, even if the onus is on the Crown, in most
cases the youth is still likely to adduce evidence about his background
and character, and to attempt to establish that he is likely to be rehabilitated
within the youth justice system. It would seem wrong to place any reliance
on the fact that in some cases the issue of onus may be practically
insignificant. There are clearly cases in which the issue of onus may be
determinative, and R. v. T. (K.D.)42 may well be one of them. It is notable
that in R. v. T. (K.D.) the trial judge found that section 72(2) was
unconstitutional, placed an onus on the Crown, and decided not to
impose an adult sentence, while the Court of Appeal upheld the
constitutionality of the provision, placed an onus on the youth, and imposed
an adult sentence.
(c) The Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. B. (D.)
Just six weeks after the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision
in R. v. T. (K.D.),43 the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered its contrary
decision in R. v. B. (D.),44 agreeing with the 2003 Quebec Court of
Appeal ruling that section 72(2) of the YCJA45 violates section 7 of the
Charter. The Ontario decision discussed the importance of the section
72(2) onus, concluding that it is “significant”, involving both a tactical
onus of adducing evidence and a burden of persuasion, and observing
that for presumptive offences, the Crown might succeed in having an
adult sentence imposed even if it introduced no evidence or argument to
41

YOA, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, s. 16(1.1), as enacted by S.C. 1995, c. 19.
[2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).
43
[2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.).
44
[2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario decision also followed
the Quebec judgment in ruling that s. 110(2) of the YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1 violates the s. 7 Charter
rights of a youth, by imposing on the youth found guilty of a presumptive offence but not subject to
adult sanction the onus to justify a ban on the publication of identifying information. Although not
mentioned by the Ontario Court, publication of identifying information about young offenders not
only stigmatizes them, it may also make their rehabilitation more difficult, making a s. 1 argument
even more difficult for this provision.
45
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
42
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justify this result.46 The Ontario Court of Appeal also rejected the
argument of the Crown that section 1 of the Charter could be invoked to
save this provision, noting that the Crown conceded that it faces a very
significant onus in trying to save any impugned provision under section
1 if it is found to violate section 7 of the Charter.47
While the outcome of the constitutional challenge was the same in
the Ontario and Quebec Court of Appeal decisions, the Ontario judgment
is narrower, both in its scope and in its analysis. The Ontario Court
recognized that the 2004 decision of the Supreme Court in Canadian
Foundation for Children 48 had an impact on how section 7 of the
Charter should be applied. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court held that in deciding what constitutes a principle of
fundamental justice, consideration must be given both to the “traditions
that [establish] the basic norms for how the state deals with its citizens”
and to international law.49 The Ontario Court concluded that both of
these factors support the principle that young offenders are to be treated
differently from adults, and place a burden on the Crown to justify the
imposition of an adult sentence.
The Supreme Court decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,50
however, rejected the argument that the “best interests of the child” is a
Charter-protected principle of fundamental justice. This clearly calls
into question the fourth principle of fundamental justice articulated by the
Quebec Court of Appeal, that the “youth justice system must consider
the best interests” of a young offender. However, as noted above,
although that principle was articulated by the Quebec Court of Appeal,
it was not relied upon by that Court in its constitutional analysis, nor
was it even mentioned by the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The caution of the Ontario Court in not endorsing all of the Quebec
Court’s analysis reflects an appreciation of the significance of the

46

R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265, at para. 35 (Ont. C.A.); see also

para. 68.
47

R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265, at paras. 81-83 (Ont. C.A.).
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
49
R. v. B. (D.), [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265, at para. 52 (Ont. C.A.), quoting
from para. 8 of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth
and the Law, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
50
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
48
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Supreme Court decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,51 and
may reflect a desire to dissociate itself from some of the expansive
discussion in the Quebec decision about the interpretation of the sentencing
provisions of the YCJA52 in a way that is consistent with the “best
interests” of the child.
(d) The Supreme Court and the Convention
The Supreme Court of Canada has granted the Crown leave to appeal
R. v. B. (D.);53 the appeal was argued in October 2007 and a decision is
expected some time in 2008. While there is always risk in predicting how
the Supreme Court will resolve a controversial issue, previous decisions
of the Supreme Court appear more consistent with the approach of the
Ontario Court of Appeal. At very least, it is clear that the Supreme Court
accepts the Convention on the Rights of the Child54 as an important part of
international law that should be used to help interpret and apply both
Canada’s youth justice laws and the Charter. It would further appear that
the Court is sympathetic to the argument that Canada’s young offenders
should be treated differently from adults.
In its 2004 decision in Canadian Foundation for Children,55 the
Supreme Court dealt with a Charter-based challenge to section 43 of the
Criminal Code,56 a provision which allows parents to use “reasonable
force” for the purposes of correction. In the majority judgment of
McLachlin C.J.C., it is clear that she considers the Convention on the
Rights of the Child57 to be highly significant to the interpretation of
section 7 of the Charter. In October of 2005 in R. v. C. (R.),58 the
Supreme Court held that youth status is a factor that may be taken into
account when a court is deciding whether, pursuant to Criminal Code
section 487.051(2), to order a DNA sample from a youth found guilty of
an offence, even in the absence of any explicit provision to this effect in
51
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
52
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
53
September 28, 2006, [2006] S.C.C.A. 195 (S.C.C.).
54
Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
55
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
56
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
57
Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
58
[2005] S.C.J. No. 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.).
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either the Code or the YCJA59 Writing for a majority of the Court, Fish J.
noted that the Preamble of the YCJA specifically acknowledges that
Canada is a party to the Convention, and commented on the importance
of international law in defining the rights of youth:
In creating a separate criminal justice system for young persons,
Parliament has recognized the heightened vulnerability and reduced
maturity of young persons. In keeping with its international obligations,
Parliament has sought as well to extend to young offenders enhanced
procedural protections, and to interfere with their personal freedom
and privacy as little as possible: see the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child … incorporated by reference in the Y.C.J.A.60

(emphasis added)
In December 2005 in R. v. D. (C.),61 the Supreme Court of Canada
interpreted the concept of “violent offence” in section 39(1)(a) of the
YCJA62 in a way that restricts the use of custody for young offenders,
concluding that this provision could not be invoked to sentence to
custody a youth who was found guilty of dangerous driving in a stolen
vehicle after a high-speed police chase. Writing for a majority of the
Court, Bastarache J. again referred to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child63 as an “important” instrument for intepreting the YCJA,64 suggesting
that the Court may give significant weight to the Convention in dealing
with adult sentencing as well.
These decisions all support the view that the Court will be influenced
by the Convention on the Rights of the Child 65 in interpreting the
Charter, and seems likely to be sympathetic to the argument that there is
constitutional justification for a presumption that youth should be treated
differently from adults.

59

S.C. 2002, c. 1.
[2005] S.C.J. No. 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99, at para. 41 (S.C.C.).
61
[2005] S.C.J. No. 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.).
62
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
63
Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
64
R. v. D. (C.), [2005] S.C.J. No. 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99, at para. 35 (S.C.C.). Other recent
decisions of the Supreme Court have also recognized the importance of international law in
interpreting and applying the Charter; see, e.g., Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.).
65
Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3.
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(e) Responding to Serious Youth Offending in a Constitutionally
Acceptable Way
Some adolescents commit very violent crimes; their impulsiveness,
lack of foresight and limited moral development can result in callous,
senseless acts that have tragic consequences and understandably shock
the community. Fortunately, these acts are relatively rare; however, the
relative infrequency of these acts, and their sometimes brutal nature,
contribute to the heightened media and public attention they receive when
they do occur. There are youths, few in number, who have committed the
most serious offences, and for whom accountability and protection of the
public may require an adult length of sentence, and perhaps even a lifetime
in custody.
It must, however, be appreciated that adolescents who end up serving
all, or a portion, of their sentences in adult correctional facilities may pose
a greater risk of re-offending than those who serve their entire sentences
in the youth system. 66 Further, the limited moral and psychological
development of adolescents requires that the justice system should hold
them less accountable than adults who commit the same offences. This
suggests that the legal regime for young offenders should reserve
an adult sentence for exceptional cases, and should place an onus on
the prosecution to justify this type of sanction. Placing an onus on the
prosecution to justify an adult sentence seems most consistent with
Canada’s obligations under international law and the Charter.
The unfortunate reality is that those youths who commit the most
serious and senseless crimes are precisely those who lack foresight and
judgment, and who will not likely be deterred by adult sentences. Adult
sentencing for the most violent of young offenders may be justified on
accountability principles, but it will not produce a safer society. A reduction
in serious violent offending cannot be achieved by a “legislative quick fix”,
but rather requires a resource-intensive combination of preventative,
enforcement and rehabilitative services.

66

See, e.g., D.M. Bishop et al., “The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It
Make a Difference?” (1996) 42 Crime & Delinquency 171; R.E. Redding, “Recidivism rates in
juvenile versus criminal court” (2000) Charlottesville, VA: Institute of Law, Psychiatry, & Public
Policy, University of Virginia online: <http://www.ilppp.virginia.edu/Juvenile_Forensic_Fact_Sheets/
RecidRates.html>.
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2. Police Stops for a “Chit Chat”: Detention and Search
While there is controversy about the extent of racial profiling by police,
there is no doubt that “age profiling” frequently occurs: adolescents are
much more likely to be stopped by the police than are adults.67 This may
in part reflect the fact that youth are more likely to be out at night on
the streets and in other “high crime” public places, but there is also
undoubtedly a degree of stereotyping by police, who are aware that criminal
activity peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood. While age profiling
may result in police apprehending some youth offenders, it also results
in the harassment of many innocent youth and increases youth distrust
of the police. Further, this police action may result in unconstitutional
searches and questioning of youth by police.
The concerns about violations of the rights of youth as a result of
police practices are illustrated by the Ontario case of R. v. D. (J.).68 At
about 11 p.m. one night in December 2004, two Toronto police officers
observed three visible-minority youths wearing dark baggy clothes walking
down the street in a “high crime area”. The police decided to stop the
youths for what they referred to as a “chit chat”. The officers had no basis
for stopping these youths, and were not investigating a crime, but rather
did this as part of “proactive policing in a high crime area”. The officers
stopped the boys and said something like: “Guys, stop for a second, we
want to talk to you.” They asked the boys their names and birth dates, and
did a Canadian Police Information Centre (“C.P.I.C”) search, discovering
that one of the youths was in violation of the terms of his bail conditions.
The police then arrested this youth, searched him and found him in
possession of a replica handgun. They then arrested and searched the other
two youths, and found various items including a crowbar in a knapsack
carried by one of them. All three were initially charged with possession
of burglary tools, though the Crown withdrew charges against the youth
who did not have any items on his person or in his knapsack.
At a voir dire on the admissibility of the items seized, the police
acknowledged that the boys were not told that they could refuse to
respond to questions. The youth who was not on bail testified that he
was “frequently” stopped and questioned by the police, once or twice a
week, and that he did not feel that he was free to leave, nor did he feel
67
See, e.g., J. Waddington, K. Stenson & D. Don, “In Proportion: Race, and Police Stop
and Search” (2004) 44 Brit. J. Crim. 889.
68
[2007] O.J. No. 1365 (Ont. C.J.), per P.J. Jones J.
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that he had any option but to answer the officers’ questions. One of the
officers testified:
that it was his practice to ask an individual’s name and birth date when
he was “investigating” them. In cross examination he agreed that in
this situation, he was “investigating” the three boys for being in the
area. “My suspicion was based on the circumstances which I explained
to you before: the late hour, the fact that they were all dressed in black,
the fact that they were all youths. My suspicion was that they were up
to — let me put it rashly — no good.”69

(emphasis added)
This statement reflects common police attitudes, but is also quite
astonishing. Imagine if the officer admitted that a reason for stopping the
youths was not their age, but their race! Justice Jones concluded that the
police had not violated the Charter rights of the youth who was in violation
of the terms of his bail order and had possession of a replica handgun.
Regarding the other youth, she concluded that there had been a violation
of his rights under both section 8 (to be free from “unreasonable search”)
and section 9 (“unlawful detention”). In the course of ruling that the
admission of the evidence obtained would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute and hence should be excluded under section 24(2)
of the Charter, she placed significant emphasis on the fact that the case
involved youth:
The practice by the police of obtaining identifying personal
information from individuals, especially young people, where no crime
is being investigated and there are no reasonable grounds to detain,
with the intention of conducting a C.P.I.C. search …without explaining
to that person his right to refuse to provide that information or the
jeopardy he or she faces by providing that information, amounts, in
my opinion, to an abuse of police powers. This is particularly concerning
when one considers that young persons, who are typically the target
of these policing practices, have been granted enhanced procedural
protections … under the Youth Criminal Justice Act because of their
age and stage of development. ...
… [T]he constitutional violation occasioned by the arbitrary
detention of J.D. was significant. In reaching that assessment, I bear in
mind not only the direct impact on the rights of J.D. of “pro-active
policing”, but the potential impact on the constitutional rights of the

69

R. v. D. (J.), [2007] O.J. No. 1365, at para. 80 (Ont. C.J.).
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indeterminate number of young people who may have been subjected
to the same arbitrary detention and questioning in the name of this
police initiative …
Most importantly, the significance of … institutional failures, in
assessing police conduct, particularly where an institutional policy
effectively drives a pattern of legal non-compliance, cannot be
underestimated …70

(emphasis added)
Youth are particularly vulnerable to police harassment as they are
often unaware of their rights, are easily intimidated by the police and are
frequently in public places. Decisions like R. v. D. (J.)71 are important,
as they provide constitutional protections for the integrity of youth while
they are walking down the street. Some aspects of the analysis of Jones J.
in D. (J.) may have to be reassessed in light of the recent Ontario Court of
Appeal decision in R. v. B. (L.).72 While a full analysis of that controversial
appellate decision is beyond the scope of this paper (and appears elsewhere
in this volume), that decision would suggest that police may have a “chat”
with a youth that may include asking the youth for name and birth date
while a C.P.I.C. check is being run without the youth being “detained”
under section 9 of the Charter. It is, however, submitted that B. (L.) can
be distinguished from D. (J.), as the youth in D. (J.) did testify and
explain that when he was stopped by the police, he felt “psychologically
detained”, while the youth in B. (L.) did not testify at the voir dire and
actually approached the officers to strike up a conversation. It is also
important to note that in B. (L.) Moldaver J.A. accepted that youth
should be a factor in deciding whether detention occurred:

70
R. v. D. (J.), [2007] O.J. No. 1365, at paras. 87-89 (Ont. C.J.). Justice Jones also quoted
Laforme J. in R. v. Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 21 C.R. (6th) 65, at 77-78 (Ont S.C.J.):
It needs repeating once again: Stopping and investigating people merely because of
some “Spidey sense” being engaged goes far beyond the standards our society demands and
expects of our police. Young people have the right to “just hang out”, especially in their
neighbourhood, and to move freely without fear of being detained and searched on a mere
whim, and without being advised of their rights and without their consent. Mere hunches do
not give the police the grounds to “surprise” a group of young people, or to “get right on them”
for investigative purposes without something further that provides a lawful basis for doing so.
See also R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 85 O.R. (3d) 127, at para. 61 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.), where Doherty J.A. suggested that age should be a factor
in the application of s. 24(2) of the Charter when deciding whether to exclude an incriminating
statement given to the police in violation of Charter rights.
71
R. v. D. (J.), [2007] O.J. No. 1365 (Ont. C.J.).
72
[2007] O.J. No. 3290 (Ont. C.A.).
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The respondent’s conduct in approaching the officers hardly fits
the image of a frightened youth who felt psychologically compelled to
submit to the police in deprivation of his liberty. On the contrary, it
speaks to a street-wise teenager who quickly sized up the situation and
determined that his best defence in the circumstances was a strong
offence. Put simply, this was not a case of psychological compulsion
exerted by the police; it was a case of psychological control attempted
by the respondent.73

(emphasis added)
The ultimate outcome in B. (L.) may well be justifiable, in particular its
application of section 24(2) of the Charter to a situation where a loaded
handgun was seized from a youth on school property. It is, however,
submitted that in dealing with the issue of whether detention of a youth
has occurred, B. (L.) should not be extended to cases in which the police
have stopped a youth. Otherwise, there will be an invitation to police to
stop and question an “indeterminate number of [innocent] young people”
undermining the respect of youth for the justice system and the rules of
society. Further, it is submitted that in applying section 24(2), courts should
take into account that the person whose rights were violated is a youth.
3. Police Investigations and Questioning: Statutory and
Constitutional Rights
Parliament, recognizing the vulnerability of youth, enacted various
provisions of the YCJA74 to provide youths who are arrested with
significant rights and protections that are not afforded to adults. As soon
as a youth is arrested, the police75 must inform the youth of the right to
consult a lawyer.76 Further, section 146(2) of the YCJA (and before that
the YOA77 section 56(2)) provides that if a statement of a youth to the
police is to be admitted in evidence, there is an onus on the Crown to
establish on the balance of probabilities that the questioning police officer
gave the youth a clear explanation of his or her rights. This includes an
73

R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.).
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
75
The obligation to caution a youth about rights applies to any “person in authority” and
may extend to a probation officer or youth worker, especially one who is the employee of a police
service even if not a police officer: see R. v. F. (N.R.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 1287 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), per
Romilly Prov. Ct. J.
76
See YCJA, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 25.
77
R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1.
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explanation of the right to silence, and the right to consult and have present
during questioning a parent and a lawyer, as well as an explanation of
the fact that any statement made by the youth may be used in evidence
at trial. The explanation must be in language “appropriate to the youth’s
age and understanding”. If any rights are to be waived, especially if
there is waiver of the right to counsel: “Not only must the waiver be
clear and unequivocal, but [the youth’s] understanding must also be full
and complete.”78 If a youth expresses a wish to contact a lawyer, police
must cease questioning the youth and use reasonable efforts to assist the
youth in contacting a lawyer.79
The statutory rights afforded youths at the time of questioning by
the police under the YCJA80 section 146(2) are significantly broader than
the rights afforded under the Charter, and the onus is on the Crown to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the youth was given an adequate
explanation of his or her rights, and that the statement was voluntary.
Further, the Crown must establish on the balance of probabilities the
validity of any waiver of rights under section 146(4),81 and a violation of
section 146(2) will result in the exclusion of the statement unless there
was a mere “technical irregularity”. By way of contrast, if a Charter breach
is alleged, the onus is on the youth to establish a violation on the balance of
probabilities, and even if there is a breach, the statement may still be
admitted if doing so would not bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.
For these reasons, although there is a great deal of case law in which
youth challenge the admissibility of statements made by them to “persons
in authority”, most cases are argued under the YCJA82 and the common
law voluntariness standard. There are, however, some important cases
involving youth and a violation of the Charter rights by police during
questioning of a youth. Most notable is the 1993 Supreme Court decision
in R. v. I. (L.R.),83 where the Supreme Court took account of the “young
offender context” in interpreting section 10 of the Charter and ruled
inadmissible two confessions to a police officer made by a youth in regard
to a homicide. Of significance for present purposes, the Court held that
78

R. v. K. (O.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 1458, at para. 96 (B.C. Youth. Ct.), per McKinnon Yth. Ct. J.
R. v. B. (D.R.), [2004] B.C.J. No. 1092 (B.C. Youth Ct.).
80
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
81
R. v. H. (L.T.), [2006] N.S.J. No. 409 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal allowed, [2006] S.C.C.A.
No. 509 (S.C.C.).
82
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
83
[1993] S.C.J. No. 132, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.).
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if a youth faces a very serious charge, his waiver of the right to counsel
guaranteed by section 10 of the Charter is valid only if the “young person
is aware of the consequences of his or her actions, including the possibility
of being raised to adult court”.84 This Supreme Court decision clearly
recognized the special vulnerability of youth, imposing obligations on the
police to give youths charged with the most serious offences and facing
the possibility of an adult sanction a special caution.
There have also been a few cases that have raised Charter issues
concerning police investigative practices regarding youths in situations
where a violation of the Charter resulted in the police obtaining physical
evidence implicating the youth. In R. v. R. (G.M.)85 the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal, citing R. v. I. (L.R.),86 upheld a youth court decision
that excluded fingerprint evidence obtained after a violation of the youth’s
right to consult counsel. While the youth consulted with his mother, the
Court emphasized that he also had the right to consult counsel, and this
right was “crucial” and “distinct” from the right to consult with a parent,
and was not waived.
In R. v. A. (A.),87 the Court considered the admissibility of evidence
obtained by the police after entry into an apartment occupied by four
youths. The police knocked on the door and asked to be admitted, and one
of the youths let them in without comment. The officers questioned the
youths, without advising them of their rights, extensively searched the
apartment and seized an item that was physical evidence of criminal
negligence causing bodily injury, the criminal act under investigation.
Justice Flaherty emphasized that the youths were not aware of their rights,
and no effort was made to contact their parents. He ruled that the entry
was unlawful and violated section 8 of the Charter:
To waive a constitutionally protected right it’s trite law that you
have to be aware of the right to and of the consequences of, consenting
or refusing. If you’re consenting there has to be clear and cogent
evidence of that consent. Mere acquiescence is not consent. On these
facts consent to enter these premises was never sought. In any event, it
wasn’t given, or acquiesced in.88

84
85
86
87
88

R. v. I. (L.R.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 132, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504, at 524 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.
[1993] S.C.J. No. 132, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.).
[1994] N.S.J. No. 566 (N.S.C.A.).
[2003] O.J. No. 5137 (Ont. C.J.).
[2003] O.J. No. 5137, at para. 13 (Ont. C.J.).
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Invoking section 24(2) to rule the evidence inadmissible, Flaherty J. noted
that there were no “exigent circumstances” that justified a warrantless
entry, and no effort to obtain the permission of a parent or guardian for
entry into the apartment and for conducting a search.
In cases involving the obtaining of breathalyzer samples, however,
the courts have not been very sympathetic to the argument that special
protections should be afforded youths under the Charter section 10. In
R. v. E. (G.), Ross J. observed:
I am also not satisfied that [a] … case in which a young driver faces
a charge of driving while his blood-alcohol content was in excess of
the legislated level, requires extraordinary measures to protect the
constitutional rights of young persons. It is not the same situation as
where a young person is being questioned by the authorities. In that
situation … both Parliament and the courts have recognized the need
for special protection for youths. On the other hand, when it comes to
driving offences and the provision of breath samples, neither Parliament
nor the courts have granted special rights to young persons. 89

Leaving aside the breathalyzer cases, the courts have recognized the
vulnerability of youth when youths are being investigated for crimes.
Although the jurisprudence reveals a degree of vagueness in the weight
to be given to this factor, police are expected to afford greater respect for
the Charter rights of youth, or the Crown may find that wrongfully obtained
evidence will be excluded.
4. A Youth’s Sense of Time: Trial within a “Reasonable Time”
(Charter Section 11(b))
Parliament and the courts have recognized that adolescents have a
“different sense of time” than adults. The courts have accepted that youth
is a factor to take into account in applying the Charter section 11(b)
guarantee to the right to a trial within a reasonable time. In the 1991 Ontario
Court of Appeal decision in R. v. M. (G.C.), a case decided under the
YOA,90 Osbourne J.A. stated:
In my opinion, the general principles set out in Askov … apply to
young offenders. There is a particular need to conclude youth court
proceedings without unreasonable delay, consistent with the goals of the
89
[2004] A.J. No. 889, at para. 20 (Alta. Q.B.). Leave to appeal refused [2004] A.J. No. 1372
(Alta. C.A.) and [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 138 (S.C.C.), though the appeal courts did not deal with this issue.
90
R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1.
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Young Offenders Act and the principles upon which it is based. I do not,
however, view young persons as being entitled to a special constitutional
guarantee to trial within a reasonable time, which differs in substance
from that available to adults. Nonetheless, it seems to me that, as general
proposition, youth court proceedings should proceed to a conclusion
more quickly than those in the adult criminal justice system. Delay,
which may be reasonable in the adult criminal justice system, may not
be reasonable in the youth court. There are sound reasons for this.
They include the well-established fact that the ability of a young person
to appreciate the connection between behaviour and its consequences
is less developed than an adult’s. For young persons, the effect of time
may be distorted. If treatment is required … it is best begun with as
little delay as is possible. 91

(emphasis added)
Since that decision was rendered, the YCJA92 was enacted, with section
3(1)(b) specifying that:
(b) the criminal justice system for young persons must be separate from
that of adults and emphasize the following…
(iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending
behaviour and its consequences, and
(v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for
enforcing this Act must act, given young persons’ perception of
time;

There have been more recent appellate judgments which have held
that this provision was intended to “simply codify and make explicit
what was recognized in the earlier jurisprudence”, in particular R. v. M.
(G.C.),93 and have reversed youth court decisions that ordered a stay.94
While status as a youth is clearly only one factor in deciding whether to
issue a stay, there have also been cases in which this would appear to
have been the decisive factor. In the brief 2005 decision R. v. H. (M.),95
the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the order of the youth court judge to
issue a stay almost two years after charges had been laid, observing that
91

[1991] O.J. No. 885, 3 O.R. (3d) 223 at 230 (Ont. C.A.).
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
93
[1991] O.J. No. 885, 3 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont. C.A.).
94
R. v. D. (R.C.), [2006] B.C.J. No. 947, at para. 31 (B.C.C.A.), per Hall J.A. See also R. v.
R. (T.), [2005] O.J. No. 2150, 75 O.R. (3d) 645 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290,
at para. 87 (Ont. C.A.) (obiter).
95
[2005] O.J. No. 1585 (Ont. C.A.).
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after one year, “the case was already pushing the limits of what could be
considered reasonable for the trial of a young person on what appeared
to be relatively uncomplicated charges. It was incumbent on the system
to give this case some priority.”96 In its decision, the Court of Appeal
noted that “memories fade over time”. Although not explicitly mentioned
by the Court, it is notable that memories of children and youths fade more
quickly than for adults. 97 While the courts have recognized youth as a
factor in section 11(b) cases, it would be helpful to have a clearer
articulation of the weight to be given this factor, and it would be appropriate
for this factor to be given significant weight.
5. Youth in Schools: Less Respect for Rights
While the courts have been especially protective of the Charter
rights of youth when they are being dealt with by the police, a concern
about the “well-being” of children has resulted in courts significantly
reducing the rights afforded to youth when they are subject to search
and questioning by school officials, who are also a class of state agents.
The leading case on the restricted protections afforded youth in
school is the Supreme Court decision in R. v. M. (M.R.).98 A junior high
school vice-principal received information from other students that the
accused, a 13-year-old student, intended to sell drugs at a school dance.
When, in response to questioning at the vice-principal’s office, the youth
denied that he was in possession of drugs, the vice-principal then searched
the youth. Pursuant to school policy, a plain clothes police officer had
been called by the vice-principal, and was present but said nothing while
the vice-principal spoke to the youth and searched him. The vice-principal
seized a cellophane bag containing marijuana and gave it to the constable,
who advised the accused that he was under arrest for possession of a
narcotic. The youth court judge found that the search violated the youth’s
rights under section 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence, resulting
in the acquittal of the youth. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal ruled that
the trial judge had erred in excluding this evidence, a conclusion affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada.

96

[2005] O.J. No. 1585 at paras. 5, 6 (Ont. C.A.).
N.L. Stein, P.A. Ornstein, B. Tversky & C. Brainerd, eds., Memory for Everyday and
Emotional Events (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), see esp. 213 -17.
98
[1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.).
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While in R. v. M. (M.R.)99 the Supreme Court accepted that the
vice-principal was an agent of the state, and was obliged to comply with
section 8 of the Charter in conducting a search, it also ruled that a
school official did not have to meet the standards of a police officer for
the conduct of the search. A school official has significant leeway in
determining what constitutes “reasonable grounds” for a search, and
does not require a warrant to search a student, as long as the official is
not acting as “an agent for the police”. In this case, even though a police
officer was present during the search, the Court concluded that the viceprincipal was not “an agent of the police”. The Court gave school officials
significant authority to enforce the rules of the school, even when their
acts resulted in the seizure of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
Justice Cory emphasized the important role of teachers and schools for
youth and society:
Teachers and those in charge of our schools are entrusted with the care
and education of our children. It is difficult to imagine a more important
trust or duty. To ensure the safety of the students and to provide them with
the orderly environment so necessary to encourage learning, reasonable
rules of conduct must be in place and enforced at schools.100

The Court then concluded that, in order to allow school officials to
effectively discharge their duties, it is necessary to give them a broader
set of powers than those afforded the police. Accordingly, the rights of
youth in dealing with those officials are restricted in comparison with
the rights that they have in their dealings with police:
[T]eachers and principals must be able to act quickly to protect their
students and to provide the orderly atmosphere required for learning.
If a teacher were told that a student was carrying a dangerous weapon
or sharing a dangerous prohibited drug the parents of all the other
students at the school would expect the teacher to search that student.
The role of teachers is such that they must have the power to search.
… It follows that their expectation of privacy will be lessened while
they attend school… This reduced expectation of privacy coupled with
the need to protect students and provide a positive atmosphere for
learning clearly indicate that a more lenient and flexible approach
should be taken to searches conducted by teachers and principals than
would apply to searches conducted by the police. 101
99
100
101

[1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.).
R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).
R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, at para. 47 (S.C.C.).
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Thus, youth who are in a school have more restricted Charter rights
when being questioned or searched by school officials. However, if the
police lead an investigation in a school, they generally are obliged to
afford youth the same rights as they would in other settings, as illustrated
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. M. (A.).102 A high school principal
told the local police that they could bring sniffer dogs into the school to
search for drugs whenever a dog was available. Two years after the general
invitation, but without a specific request to attend that day, three police
officers and a sniffer dog arrived at the school and asked for and obtained
permission from the principal “to go through the school”. Neither the
police nor the principal had specific reason to believe that there were
drugs in the school that day. Students were confined in classrooms for
up to two hours while the police conducted a search with the dog. After
the students’ lockers were searched, the police and the dog went to the
school gym, where the dog reacted to a backpack lying next to a wall. A
police officer searched the backpack and found marijuana and psilocybin.
The owner of the backpack, a student, was charged with possession of
drugs for the purpose of trafficking. The youth court judge concluded
that there had been a violation of section 8 of the Charter and excluded
the evidence under section 24(2), observing: “the rights of every student in
the school were violated that day as they were all subject to an unreasonable
search.” 103 The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, concluding that
the sniffing by the dog constituted a search. Further, this was a search
by police, but:
[E]ven if this was a search by school authorities through the agency of
the police, there is nothing in the Education Act … that gives the
required authority to conduct such a search … ‘To admit the evidence
is effectively to strip A.M. and any other student in a similar situation
of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.’ 104

A Crown appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was argued on May 22,
2007, with a decision reserved. If the Supreme Court reverses the Court
of Appeal, it will mean that students could be subjected to random
searches by the police or teachers any time that they are at school.
102

[2006] O.J. No. 1663, 79 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2006]
S.C.C.A. No. 229 (S.C.C.).
103
R. v. M. (A.), [2004] O.J. No. 2716, at para. 25 (Ont. C.J.), per Hornblower J.
104
[2006] O.J. No. 1663, 79 O.R. (3d) 481, at paras. 53 and 62 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
allowed [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 229 (S.C.C.), in part quoting with approval from the trial judge,
Hornblower J., in R. v. M. (A.), [2004] O.J. No. 2716 (Ont. C.J.).
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III. CHILDREN AND YOUTH AS VICTIMS AND WITNESSES
1. Special Protections for Child and Youth Witnesses
In a series of amendments to the Criminal Code105 and the Canada
Evidence Act106 between 1988 and 2006,107 Parliament enacted a number
of provisions to facilitate the giving of evidence by persons under the
age of 18, including legislation allowing youth to testify via closed-circuit
television or from behind a screen, to have a support person sit near
them while they testify, and to admit into evidence a videotape of a prior
interview with the youth. Most recently, the competency test for child
witnesses has been substantially reformed, abolishing any inquiry into
whether a child can demonstrate understanding of the promise to tell the
truth, and creating a presumption of competency for children. The Supreme
Court of Canada and lower courts have consistently rejected constitutional
challenges to these provisions by accused persons, recognizing that they
are constitutionally justified by the special vulnerability of youth and the
desire to promote the search for the truth. In upholding the constitutionality
of the provision allowing a child to testify from behind a screen in 1993,
L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v.
Levogiannis, observed:
The plight of children who testify and the role courts must play in
ascertaining the truth must not be overlooked in the context of the
constitutional analysis in the case at hand. As this Court has said, children
may require different treatment than adults in the courtroom setting. ...108

Accordingly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision, which
at that time allowed a judge to permit a child under the age of 18 to
testify outside the courtroom in cases involving specified sexual offences,
provided that the judge was satisfied that this was “necessary in order
for the child to give a full and candid account of the acts complained of”.
The Court rejected arguments by the accused that this violated his right to
a fair trial, as guaranteed by sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In
105

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
107
See discussion in Nicholas Bala, “Double Victims: Child Sexual Abuse and the Criminal
Justice System” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 3; Nicholas Bala, “Increasing Protections for Women and
Children: Bills C-126 & 128” (1993) 21 C.R. (4th) 365; and Nicholas Bala, Katherine DuvallAntonacopoulos, Rod Lindsay, Kang Lee & Victoria Talwar, “Bill C-2: A New Law for Canada’s
Child Witnesses” (2006) 32 C.R. (6th) 48.
108
[1993] S.C.J. No. 70, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, at para. 15 (S.C.C.). For a similar American
decision, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
106
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coming to this conclusion, the Court accepted that there must be some
“balancing” of the rights of accused persons and the interests of children:
Section 486(2.1) of the Criminal Code has been carefully worded
to protect the rights of accused, while at the same time facilitating the
giving of evidence by young victims of sexual abuse of varying kinds. …
Parliament has devised s. 486(2.1) in such a way as to properly
balance the goal of ascertaining the truth and the protection of children
as well as the rights of accused to a fair trial by allowing crossexamination and by tailoring the use of screens to the complainants’
age and confining their use to limited and specific types of crimes. 109

The 2006 enactment, section 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code,110
considerably expanded the scope of this provision, stipulating that if an
application is made by prosecutor or child, the judge “shall” make an order
to allow the child to testify from behind a screen or via closed-circuit
television, “unless the judge ... is of the opinion that the order would
interfere with the proper administration of justice”. This statutory exception
is narrow,111 and might, for example, be invoked if the equipment available
did not give the accused, judge and jury a good view of the child, or if
there was inadequate provision for private communication between
the accused and his or her counsel. Significantly, there is no longer a
requirement for the Crown to establish that use of this provision is
necessary for a child to give a “full and candid account of the acts
complained of”.112 The constitutionality of the new provision was upheld
by Dhillon Prov. Ct. J. in R. v. H. (C.N.),113 where she observed that
“there is a valid legislative basis for requiring the presumptive or mandatory
order, given the lack of success in affording aids to child witnesses
under the predecessor legislation.” She concluded that this provision was
consistent with the rights of an accused to a fair trial, as the court retained
the authority to decline to use a screen or closed-circuit television if
109

[1993] S.C.J. No. 70, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, at paras. 40-41 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
111
A number of cases under the 2006 provision have emphasized that it is much easier to
satisfy the test for use of closed-circuit television. For example, in R. v. Elmer, [2006] B.C.J. No. 585
(B.C. Prov. Ct.) Godfrey Prov. Ct. J. observed that the previous provision set out a “different and
higher standard”.
112
Although beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the 2006 provisions
also allow for a vulnerable adult to testify by closed-circuit television, but for this to occur the
Crown must satisfy the court that it is “necessary to obtain a full and candid account” from the
witness, as might, for example, occur in some domestic violence cases: see Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46, s. 486.2(2), enacted S.C. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.
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[2006] B.C.J. No. 782 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
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doing so would “interfere with the proper administration of justice”. While
the 2006 provision is significantly broader than the original provision,
which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1993 in R. v. Levogiannis,114
it seems highly likely that higher courts will follow the approach of
Dhillon Prov. Ct. J. in R. v. H. (C.N.) and uphold the constitutionality of
the new provision.115
In its 1993 decision in R. v. L. (D.O.),116 the Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the constitutional validity of section 715.1, which allowed for a
court to admit a video-recording of an investigative interview with a child
about a sexual offence, provided that the child testified and adopted the
statements, and was therefore available for cross-examination. Chief
Justice Lamer recognized the vulnerability of children and youth, and
their dominance by adults, and concluded that the provision was:
a response to the dominance and power which adults, by virtue of
their age, have over children. Accordingly, s. 715.1 is designed to
accommodate the needs and to safeguard the interests of young victims of
various forms of sexual abuse, irrespective of their sex. By allowing for
the videotaping of evidence under certain express conditions, s. 715.1
not only makes participation in the criminal justice system less stressful
and traumatic for child and adolescent complainants, but also aids in the
preservation of evidence and the discovery of truth.117

As with other child witness-related provisions, section 715.1 was amended
in 2006 to apply to any offence, and to create a presumption that a videorecording will be admitted into evidence, unless the court is “of the
opinion that admission of the video-recording … would interfere with
the proper administration of justice”. Although there are no reported
decisions on the constitutionality of this new provision, it seems likely
that it too will be considered to be consistent with the Charter, even
though this would involve an extension of the reasoning of L. (D.O.).
Until 2006, a young child was permitted to testify only if the court
was satisfied that the child understood the significance of the “promise
to tell the truth” and had the “ability to communicate the evidence”.118
In 2006 Canada Evidence Act section 16.1 came into force, creating a
114

[1993] S.C.J. No. 70, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.).
See R. v. S. (J.), [2007] B.C.J. No. 1374 (B.C.S.C.), per Metzger J., which cited and
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[1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, at 428 (S.C.C.).
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Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5; and R. v. F. (W.J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 61,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.).
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presumption that all witnesses “have the capacity to testify”. While
children are required to “promise to tell the truth” before being permitted
to testify, section 16.1(8) specifies that no child shall be “asked any
questions regarding their understanding of the nature of the promise
to tell the truth for the purpose of determining whether their evidence
shall be received by the court”. A party who is challenging the competence
of a child to testify bears the onus of satisfying that there is a genuine
issue about the child’s ability to communicate in court, and if there is an
inquiry, the sole test for competence is whether the child is “able to
understand and respond to questions”.119 Trial courts have held that the
new process and test for assessing the competence of child witnesses in
the 2006 law are consistent with the rights of an accused to a fair trial,
and with the principles of fundamental justice. In rejecting a Charter
challenge to the new provision, Antifaev Prov. Ct. J. reviewed the
psychological research that supported the enactment of the new law, and
concluded: “The question really is not whether the child understands the
duty of telling the truth or can articulate that duty, but whether the child
is in fact telling the truth.”120
The decisions upholding the constitutionality of the criminal laws that
afford child and youth witnesses special protections reflect the fact that
the courts recognize the unique and vulnerable nature of this stage of life,
and are, in effect, prepared to afford it a special constitutional status.
2. Correctional Use of Force — Lesser Protection within the Family
Parents are given a broad range of powers at common law and under
legislation to make decisions affecting their children and to control their
lives. Further, it has been accepted that under the Charter, some parental
rights are aspects of a parent’s “security of the person”, and hence entitled
to constitutional protection, in particular when the state is threatening a
parental relationship with a child in protection proceedings.121 It has also
been accepted by the courts that children have a constitutional right to
“liberty and security of the person”, which they may assert in some
situations in their own capacity. Accordingly, both parents and children
119

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, as amended by S.C. 2005, c. 32, s. 27.
R. v. S. (M.), unreported, (August 31, 2006) B.C. Prov. Court (Youth Court) File No. 7740I.
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and R. v. S. (J.), [2007] B.C.J. No. 1374 (B.C.S.C.), per Metzger J.
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have the right to have state intervention under child welfare laws only
“in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. It is only once a
court has determined that the state has proven that there is sufficient
evidence of parental abuse, neglect or incapacity that the constitutional
rights of children and their parents may start to diverge in a child
welfare proceeding. There are some situations in which the rights of
children and parents must be balanced against each other, as illustrated
by Canadian Foundation for Children.122 This 2004 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutional validity of section
43 of the Criminal Code,123 which allows parents to use reasonable force
on children “for the purpose of correction”. The Court observed that
section 7 of the Charter can only be invoked when a state action curtails
the liberty or security of the person of a child, so that a child could not,
for example, invoke the Charter to bring a court application to compel
parents to do something. However, the Court accepted that to the extent
that parents are relying on a state-enforced legal regime to exercise
powers over their children, the legal regime must be consistent with the
Charter. The Supreme Court recognized that parents should be given a
significant degree of autonomy to raise their children as they see fit.
While accepting that children are clearly a “highly vulnerable group”
and hence entitled to the protection of section 15 of the Charter, the
majority of the Court also held that section 43 of the Criminal Code124
corresponds to “actual needs and circumstances of children”, and hence
does not “discriminate” against children.125 In coming to this conclusion,
McLachlin C.J.C., writing for a majority of the Court, emphasized the
importance of respecting the role and rights of parents to make decisions
about how to raise their children.
Children need to be protected from abusive treatment. They are
vulnerable members of Canadian society ... the government responds
to the critical need of all children for a safe environment. Yet this is
not the only need of children. Children also depend on parents ... for
guidance and discipline, to protect them from harm and to promote
their healthy development within society. A stable and secure family
... is essential to this growth process.
122
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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Section 43 is Parliament’s attempt to accommodate both of these
needs. It provides parents and teachers with the ability to carry out the
reasonable education of the child without the threat of sanction by the
criminal law. The criminal law will decisively condemn and punish
force that harms children … [but introducing] the criminal law into
children’s families and educational environments in [non-abusive]
circumstances would harm children more than help them. So Parliament
has decided not to do so, preferring the approach of educating parents
against physical discipline.
This decision, far from ignoring the reality of children’s lives, is
grounded in their lived experience… The decision not to criminalize
such conduct is not grounded in devaluation of the child, but in a concern
that to do so risks ruining lives and breaking up families — a burden
that in large part would be borne by children and outweigh any benefit
derived from applying the criminal process. 126

Although affording constitutional recognition to some of the rights
of parents, the Court did circumscribe the authority of parents, ruling
that any corporal punishment that is used on a child could only result in
“transitory and trifling” pain. While permitting teachers to use reasonable
force to restrain a child or youth, the majority concluded that the
“[c]ontemporary social consensus is that, while teachers may sometimes
use corrective force to remove children from classrooms or secure
compliance with instructions, the use of corporal punishment by teachers
is not acceptable”.127 Further, the Supreme Court recognized that children
and teenagers have different needs and capacities, and in some contexts
should have different legal treatment, ruling that corporal punishment of
teenagers by either parents or teachers is not protected by section 43 of
the Criminal Code,128 although this provision can be invoked to use force
to restrain or control a youth.
The decision in Canadian Foundation for Children 129 was
controversial, with critics arguing that it gives insufficient protection to
the rights and welfare of children and youth,130 and I share some of the
126
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disappointment with the decision, in particular the dismissal of the
notion that the “best interests of the child” is one of the “principles of
fundamental justice”.131 It is, however, significant that the majority of
the Court clearly recognized that childhood and youth are different from
adulthood. While in this context this meant that there was a curtailment
of protections otherwise afforded by the criminal law, the distinction
was made because the Court believed that it would promote the interests
of children and youth within their families and schools, and accordingly
there may be other legal contexts in which this decision might be cited
as the basis for an argument that the rights of youth should be protected.

IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF YOUTH
Legislation and jurisprudence in Canada have recognized that those
under the age of 18 are not adults and have a special legal status; this
reflects their developmental stage and vulnerability, and is consistent
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.132 For some criminal law
issues, most notably in regard to youthful offenders being dealt with by
the police and youthful witnesses in the criminal courts, this is reflected
in interpretations of the Charter which afford youth special protections. In
other contexts, however, most notably in governing the relationship of
youth to parents and teachers, the Charter has been interpreted in a way
that affords youths fewer rights than adults, albeit with the judicially
articulated intent of promoting the welfare of youth.
Although often not well articulated by the courts, it is clear that
Canadian courts, led by the Supreme Court, have in effect given
constitutional recognition to the status of youth. As discussed in this
paper, the future Supreme Court decision in R. v. B. (D.)133 will address
the constitutionality of the provisions of the YCJA134 that presumptively
impose an adult sentence on youth found guilty of the most serious
in the ‘Spanking’ Case” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 879; K. Sykes, “Bambi Meets Godzilla: Children’s
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offences. I have argued that the approach most consistent with the existing
jurisprudence and the Convention on the Rights of the Child135 will be
for the Court to recognize the constitutionalization of youth, and rule
invalid the challenged provisions. It is to be hoped that the Supreme
Court will send a clear signal about the importance of youth as a factor
in Charter analysis, and that its decision will eventually affect how other
issues are dealt with by the courts.
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